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What is international law? Some people assume that the field is concerned
largely with questions of foreign law that arise in transnational commercial
transactions. Others suppose that it involves matters of high politics, perhaps
considering whether U.S. or European intervention in Bosnia would be lawful.
Either assumption, of course, is perfectly reasonable. Taken together, they
epitomize two fields often referred to as "private" and "public" international
law.
Not all aspects of international law are so easily categorized. In particular,
the doctrine of foreign state immunity sits on a fence. It is largely applied by
national judges to disputes involving, on one side, a private party. At the same
time, the doctrine is imbued with ideas and principles that governments hold
especially sacred-notions like sovereignty, equality, and noninterference in
internal affairs. These two faces of the doctrine make it a challenging one for
policymakers, practicing lawyers, judges, and academics.
The public dimension of foreign state immunity also distinguishes it from
other problems that the Hague Conference has tackled over its history. This
distinction need not suggest, however, that the topic is beyond the purview of
the Hague Conference. To the contrary, the Hague Conference's impressive
track record in addressing complex matters of transnational litigation might
position it to make a singular contribution to overcoming some of the problems
that both private parties and foreign states face in litigation against foreign
states.
This article considers the prospects for a convention on foreign state
immunity. It focuses on whether such a convention should be supported by the
United States. Two reasons exist for tying the discussion to U.S. interests.
First, a focus on a particular set of interests, which are largely shared by other
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industrialized countries, will help to sharpen the discussion. Second, definition
of "U.S. interests" is itself a challenge. A U.S. citizen seeking to sue a foreign
government for alleged torture' may perceive little commonality between his
or her interests and the interest of the U.S. Navy in avoiding suits about its base
operations.2 To develop a U.S. position about a convention, however, a
decisionmaker must understand and reconcile these two sets of interests. 3
In evalulating the prospects for a convention on foreign state immunity,
initial considerations are the existence of both the demand for a new regime and
the supply of possible regimes. Thus, this article begins with an overview of the
weaknesses of the present situation, in which U.S. law is governed by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")4 and the law of most other
countries is found in their domestic law, sometimes in statutes5 and other times
in case law.6 The article then considers what kind of convention would best
address these problems.
1. See, e.g., Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
The plaintiff alleges that he was detained and tortured by Saudi agents while employed in Saudi Arabia
as an engineer. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(b), 1602-1611 (1988)), denies immunity for certain
noncommercial torts, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988), but only if they occur in the United States. In
Nelson, the Eleventh Circuit held that Nelson's recruitment and hiring in the United States constituted
a "commercial activity," and that causes of action for injuries sustained during his alleged detention and
torture were "based on" that commercial activity because they allegedly occurred in retaliation for his
reporting safety violations at the hospital where he was employed. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1533-35.
2. See In re Canada Labour Code, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Fed. Ct. Aug. 9, 1989), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Public Serv. Alliance of Can., No 21,641 (Can.) (May 21, 1992) (Canada's Supreme Court
dismissed case in which union sought to enforce administrative order requiring U.S. Navy to permit a
representation election at U.S. Navy base) (on file with author).
3. The substantive merits of a proposed agreement are not the only issue that a government must
weigh in deciding whether to enter into a particular negotiation. Other factors (for example, broader
political agendas or the perception that a negotiation is unavoidable) may dominate and may even moot
the question whether negotiation of a particular agreement is in a government's interest.
4. United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(b), 1602-1611 (1988)). Congress enacted the FSIA
primarily to shift immunity determinations from the Executive Branch to the courts and to codify the
restrictive theory of foreign state immunity. Under the Act, foreign states are immune unless one of
eight exceptions apply. Six of these exceptions are embodied in § 1605(a) and include cases that
involve: (1) a state that has waived immunity; (2) an action based on a "commercial activity" with a
specified nexus to the United States; (3) rights in property taken in violation of international law; (4)
rights in immovable property located in the United States or property located in the United States
acquired by gift or succession; (5) certain "noncommercial torts"; or (6) enforcement or confirmation
of arbitral awards.
5. See, e.g., State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (U.K.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978) [hereinafter
U.K. Immunity Act]; State Immunity Act, 1979 (Sing.) (codified at SING. REV. STAT., 1979 Supp. at
193), reprinted in GAMAL M. BADR, STATE IMMUNITY (1984) [hereinafter Singapore Immunity Act];
Canadian State Immunity Act, 1982 (Can.) (codified at R.S.C. ch. S-18 (1985) (Can.)), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 798 (1982) [hereinafter Canadian Immunity Act]; Foreign State Immunities Act, 1985, No. 196
(Austl.), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715 (1986) [hereinafter Australian Immunity Act]; Foreign States
Immunities Act, 1981 (S. Afr.) (codified as amended at 5 JUTA'S STAT. S. AFRICA 1-428 (1991))
[hereinafter South African Immunity Act]; see also Pakistani State Immunity Ordinance, 1981, reprinted
in BADR, supra; European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972).
6. The case law of foreign state immunity is reviewed in Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign




PROBLEMS IN EXISTING LAW
In determining what we want from foreign state immunity law, be it
conventional or statutory, it is useful to recall why the United States moved to
the restrictive theory of foreign state immunity in 1952.' It did so because the
doctrine seemed the best accommodation of three competing U.S. interests: (1)
the interest in applying normal market mechanisms, including lawsuits, to
commercial relationships between U.S. private parties and foreign states; (2) the
reciprocity interest of the U.S. Government, that is, its interest in advancing
immunity rules to bar suits that would interfere with its functions; and (3) the
U.S. interest in avoiding foreign policy problems that arise if foreign govern-
ments perceive that U.S. exercise of jurisdiction goes beyond that permitted
under international law.' Thus, one way to evaluate a substantive provision of
foreign state immunity law is to ask whether it strikes the right balance among
these interests. This evaluation requires a decision whether, for example, the
interest in allowing a suit for trade libel against a foreign government is more
or less important than the interest in avoiding libel suits against the U.S.
Government and the interest in avoiding foreign policy problems that might
result if U.S. courts exercised jurisdiction in such cases.9 Once a policy
preference is established, the law should also state clear and predictable rules.
In structuring a transaction, both private parties and governments should be
able to ascertain whether the foreign state will be immune. Clear and
predictable rules may also alleviate governments' concerns about infringement
on sovereignty, either by increasing their sense that their concerns are addressed
or by enabling them to avoid situations in which they cannot expect immuni-
ty.1" Finally, immunity law should enjoy international acceptability.1 Foreign
7. In the 1952 "Tate letter," the State Department adopted the restrictive theory of foreign state
immunity, noting that "the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging
in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them
to have their rights determined in the courts." Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the
Secretary of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
8. Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360
(2d Cir. 1964) (recognizing that the U.S. government, through the restrictive theory, was attempting to
accommodate both the interests of individuals doing business with foreign governments with the interest
of foreign governments in being free to perform certain "political acts" without having to defend the
propriety of such acts before foreign courts), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). Like the State
Department in the Tate letter, the court in Victory Transport largely equates the restrictive theory with
the commercial activity exception. This shorthand is widespread, see Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the
"Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial
Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 490 n.4 (1992), and compounds the difficulty of treating
the commercial activity exception and the tort exception as parts of a unified doctrine. See infra
discussion in text following note 23.
9. See, e.g., Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
10. Legal rules are sometimes left imprecise because the drafters, be they members of Congress,
treaty negotiators, or parties to a contract, could not agree on more precise language. Other times,
imprecision reflects the difficulty of framing a rule that governs unanticipated categories of cases. The
FSIA's vague commercial activity exception appears to stem largely from such uncertainty. See, e.g.,
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government perceptions of immunity rules are shaped not only by the
substantive provisions, but also by the accompanying procedures, including
provisions on service of process, means of asserting immunity, and resort to
default judgments.12
Before turning to an examination of how the present situation measures up
against these standards,t3 it is important to recall that the FSIA was the first
national codification of foreign state immunity law and has been a model for
other countries. This discussion emphasizes the Act's flaws, but is not intended
to suggest that the entire Act be discarded. Moreover, problems with the
existing statute should not, taken alone, lead us to endorse a convention.
Rather, if those problems can be addressed by amending existing U.S. law or
through other means, a convention may be unnecessary or ill-advised.
Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
27 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Department of State Legal Adviser) (in
light of difficulty of drafting legislation delineating demarcation between commercial and governmental
activity, decided to "put ... faith in U.S. courts"). Such imprecision undermines the advantages of
codifying the law of foreign state immunity. Retrospectively, of course, a party to a dispute may prefer
an imprecise rule to one that clearly bars its claim. Prospectively, however, imprecision disserves both
private and government interests in predictability.
11. When evaluating a domestic statute, international acceptability can be assessed by measuring
the statute against an international law standard. In appraising the international acceptability of a
potential convention, the question is not international law consistency, but whether a potential
convention will attract the parties necessary to make it successful.
12. Perceptions of internationally negotiated rules may also depend on perceptions of the process
in which they were developed. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS (1990) (stating that legitimacy of international rules, which increases their pull
towards compliance, depends in part on the.pedigree of such rules). If a broadly accepted convention
on foreign state immunity is desirable, therefore, it would be important for the Hague Conference or
other sponsoring institution to structure an open and representative negotiating process.
13. This discussion focuses on problems in U.S. law, which has direct implications for U.S. private
parties seeking to sue foreign states and has reciprocity implications and foreign policy implications for
the U.S. government. A more complete consideration of this question would require closer examination
of the United States's experience as a defendant in foreign states. Inadequacies of the substantive
provisions of foreign law, however, may pose only infrequent practical problems for the United States.
Given the extent to which the FSIA limits immunity, it is unlikely that the United States often finds
itself as a defendant in a case in which the foreign state's laws deny immunity but the FSIA grants
immunity. Moreover, even when foreign law affords more immunity to the U.S. Government than the
FSIA affords to foreign governments, longstanding U.S. practice is to assert immunity only if the
activity would be immune under the FSIA. Hearings, supra note 10, at 32 (testimony of Bruno Ristau,
U.S. Department of Justice). Procedural complexities and inconsistencies, however, undoubtedly affect
the United States when it is named as a defendant in foreign courts.
Page 305: Summer 1994] FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY
A. Substantive Problems: Immunity and Minimum Contacts
The two most important exceptions to immunity are the commercial activity
exception1 4 and the tort exception.15 As such, it is important to determine if,
and how, they could be improved.
I have argued elsewhere16 that the commercial activity exception is
inadequate because it is premised on a meaningless nature-purpose distinction
and because the proxy for the nature-purpose distinction used by most
courts-whether the activity is one in which a private person can en-
gage-effectively offers the courts no guidance. Beginning in the mid-1980s,
lower courts began to rebel against the statute's requirement that they consider
nature, but not purpose. 17 The recent Supreme Court decision in Republic of
Argentina v. Weltovert8 put an end to this circumvention of the statutory
language, but did nothing to overcome the pressures that had led courts to resist
applying the statute.
One way to overcome the inadequacies of the nature-purpose test is to
abandon it and to revise the commercial activity exception along the lines of the
Australian State Immunities Act, the most recent and best developed offspring
of the 1978 State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom.' 9 Instead of relying
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1988):
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States
or of the State in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (5) (1988):
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States
or of the State in any case-
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of
that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within
the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to-
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
16. Donoghue, supra note 8.
17. Id. at 499-517.
18. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992) (holding that Argentina and Argentine Central Bank were not immune
from suit seeking to compel bank to honor obligations that it had unilaterally rescheduled).
19. Like the FSIA, the Australian statute, supra note 5, delineates exceptions to foreign state
immunity. But instead of using the nature-purpose distinction which is central to the FSIA, the
Australian Immunity Act, like the 1978 U.K. State Immunity Act, supra note 5, specifically enumerates
exceptions to immunity, including contracts of employment, bankruptcy proceedings, intellectual
property, membership in corporations and similar associations, bills of exchange, taxes, and commercial
transactions. The Australian statute describes a commercial transaction as
a commercial, trading, business, professional or industrial or like transaction into which the
foreign State has entered or a like activity in which the State has engaged [including] (a) a
contract for the supply of goods or services; (b) an agreement for a loan or some other
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on the nature-purpose distinction, the Australian statute contains a more
detailed list of situations in which immunity should be denied. These
enumerated exceptions permit a legislature to craft more precise immunity rules
and, thus, to increase the clarity and predictability of foreign state immunity law.
Enumerated exceptions like those found in the Australian statute could also be
incorporated in a convention."
The definition of commercial activity is not the only aspect of the commer-
cial activity exception that has been criticized. The Act's three separate tests
for minimum contacts have also led to considerable confusion.2 As with the
definition of commercial activity, the most obvious solution is to amend the
statute itself. One option is to eliminate the special nexus requirements that
apply to foreign governments.22 Another option is to clarify the existing
provisions to reflect the apparent congressional intent to apply different, and
more stringent, minimum contacts standards to foreign states. The choice
between these options is less stark if the commercial activity exception is
changed from the present single exception to enumerated exceptions, because
the enumerated exceptions can, as in foreign statutes, contain their own
individualized rules defining their territorial scope. 3
Turning from the commercial activity exception to the tort exception, at first
blush, appears to move from one sort of private conduct to another, for
example, from business dealings to torts incidental to governmental activity,
transaction for or in respect of the provision of finance; and (c) a guarantee or indemnity in
respect of a financial obligation, but does not include a contract of employment or a bill of
exchange.
Australian Immunity Act, supra note 5, § 11(3). Compare with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2). For a careful
discussion of the law of foreign state immunity, including comparisons of existing statutes, see
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REP. No. 24, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY (1984) [hereinafter
LAW REFORM COMM'N REPORT].
20. Indeed, the International Law Commission draft articles include such enumerated exceptions.
See infra note 23.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). See text quoted supra note 14. See generally JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA,
SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS §§ 3.8-3.10 (1988); Peter Trooboff,
Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles, 1986-V RECUEIL DES COURS 235, 335-51;
Carlos M. Vd.zquez, The Relationship between the FSIA's Commercial-Activities Exception and the Due
Process Clause, 85 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 257, 259 (1991).
22. Unless a revised statute specified that the personal jurisdiction rules that apply to private
entities also apply to foreign states, this change could increase the uncertainty of decisions under the
FSIA. In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992), the Supreme Court declined to
decide whether foreign states are "persons" for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 2169.
23. Foreign statutes and the International Law Commission's draft articles do not prescribe
generally applicable minimum contacts standards for actions against governments. See U.K. Immunity
Act, supra note 5; Singapore Immunity Act, supra note 5; Canadian Immunity Act, supra note 5;
Australian Immunity Act, supra note 5; South African Immunity Act, supra note 5; Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property: Report of the International Law Commission to
the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991) [hereinafter
1991 ILC Rep.]. The enumerated exceptions of these statutes, however, include some special nexus
requirements tailored to the exceptions. See, e.g., Australian Immunity Act, supra note 5, § 12(1)
(contracts of employment made or to be performed in Australia), § 15 (registration or protection of
inventions or trademarks, or use of a trade name "in Australia"), § 16 (membership in bodies
incorporated in Australia), § 20 (obligations imposed by Australian tax law).
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such as automobile accidents. At some time, this may have been an accurate
depiction of the two exceptions. At present, however, the commercial activity
and tort exceptions have diverged. The crux of this difference is the way that
invocations of "sovereignty" bear on the two exceptions. The commercial
activity exception preserves immunity as necessary to protect a foreign state's
"sovereignty." The contemporary tort exception, on the other hand, is available
even when the foreign state's actions are quintessentially "sovereign," for
example, when a foreign state assassinates an opponent.
Under present law, however, there is a price for the greater intrusiveness of
the tort exception. In the United States and elsewhere, tort exceptions require
a closer nexus to the territory of the forum state than do commercial activity
exceptions. This territorial limitation fits with the most often-stated rationale
for the tort exception, that "the foreign state has no privilege to commit local
physical injury or property damage. '24  Nonetheless, the limitation has
troubling consequences: a U.S. resident who fails to receive a wrench that she
orders from a foreign state-owned company may be able to sue for damages; if
the foreign government instead tortures her outside the United States, she may
not bring suit in the United States.' This dichotomy starkly illuminates the
challenges of defining the United States's interest in a particular immunity rule.
On the one hand, the United States has an interest in affording a forum to
residents who suffer at the hands of other governments, especially if the foreign
government acts in violation of international law.26  On the other hand,
relaxation of the territorial requirement would expose the United States to suits
abroad in connection, for example, with its military activities, and might lead to
charges that U.S. law was inconsistent with international law.
Even if we limit ourselves to consideration of existing U.S. law, the tort
exception raises two important questions: (1) the precise formulation of the
provision's territorial scope, that is, whether it should apply to torts committed
outside the territory of the forum state or to torts causing damage outside the
foreign state; and (2) the kinds of torts covered by the exception, that is,
whether the exception should cover not only loss or damage to tangible
property and human life, but intangible losses such as those at issue in
defamation actions or misrepresentation suits.
At present, the FSIA denies immunity for suits "in which money damages
are sought ... for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,
occurring in the United States and caused by [a] tortious act or omission of [the
foreign state]."27 Thus, the exception is limited to injuries occurring in the
United States, but the statute does not state whether the wrongful act or
24. LAw REFORM COMM'N REPORT, supra note 19, at 67.
25. The prohibition against execution against foreign state property without a "nexus" to the cause
of action compounds the disparity between the two exceptions.
26. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2368-71 (1991).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
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omission must also occur in the United States.2" Other statutes take precisely
the opposite tack, specifying that the wrongful act or omission must occur in the
forum state, without requiring that the damage occur there.29 This formulation
is truer to the stated rationale for the territorial limit,30 and it is worth
considering whether U.S. law should be revised to conform to foreign statutes
and to the congressional intention suggested by the legislative history.
As to the kinds of torts covered, the U.S. exception is limited to damages for
"personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property."'" In addition, the
FSIA preserves immunity for claims based on the exercise of a "discretionary
function, 32  and for certain listed torts, including malicious prosecution,
defamation, misrepresentation, and deceit.33 These exclusions were engrafted
onto the FSIA from the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 4  Foreign
statutes also limit the kinds of torts for which there is no immunity, but do so
by limiting the tort exception to personal injury and damage to tangible
property.35 The motivation for the two formulations appears to be the same.
The difference in structure, however, makes U.S. law less accessible to foreign
interests and, therefore, undermines both the international acceptability and
predictability of U.S. law. Recently, for example, the Supreme Court rejected
lower court interpretations of the "discretionary function" exception of the
FTCA.36 Does this mean that the FSIA has also changed, or that the two
standards have now diverged? And can foreign states reasonably be expected
to know the answer to this question?
One additional provision of the FSIA has been controversial. The FSIA's
exceptions for immunity from execution are more limited than the exceptions
for immunity from adjudication.37  The statute generally permits execution
28. Some courts, however, have suggested that the tort itself must also occur in the United States.
See Olsen by Sheldon v. Government of Mex., 729 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir.) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976) ("[T]ortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of the
United States.")), cert. denied sub nom. United Mexican States v. Olsen, 469 U.S. 917 (1984); In re
Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("tort, in whole, must occur in the United States"),
vacated, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 1984), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sedco, Inc. v.
Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co. (Pemex), 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
29. See, e.g., Australian Immunity Act, supra note 5, § 13; cf. Canadian Immunity Act, supra note
5, § 6 (follows formulation of U.S. statute). The ILC's draft articles take this latter approach, but also
impose an additional requirement that the "author of the act or omission" be present in the territory
of forum state when the act or omission occurs. 1991 ILC Rep., supra note 23, art. 12 at 102.
30. See supra note 24.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
32. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
33. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
34. Id. §§ 1326(b), 2671-2680 (1993).
35. See 1991 ILC Rep., supra note 23, art. 12, at 102; LAw REFORM COMM'N REPORT, supra note
19, at 69.
36. See generally United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1988). Under § 1610(a), a foreign state's property in the United States used
for commercial activity is subject to attachment in aid of execution only if the foreign state has explicitly
or implicitly waived its immunity from attachment; the property was used for the commercial activity
on which the claim is based; the property in question was taken, or has been exchanged for property
taken, in violation of international law; the property was acquired by gift or succession; the property
is immovable and is not the site of a diplomatic or consular mission; the property is the basis of an
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against property of an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state engaged in
commercial activity in the United States. 38  In the case of judgments against
the foreign state itself, however, the statute only permits execution against
property that "is or was used for the commercial, activity upon which the claim
is based."39 This so-called "nexus requirement" gained notoriety in the Letelier
case.' There, the survivors of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt alleged that
the Government of Chile had assassinated the former Chilean ambassador and
his associate in the United States. After obtaining a default judgment against
the Government of Chile," they sought to execute the judgment against the
Chilean airline.42 They failed largely because the Second Circuit declined to
disregard the separate corporate form of the Chilean airline.43
In the wake of the decision in Letelier, the FSIA has been described as a
statute that provides a "right without a remedy."" Legislation to eliminate the
nexus requirement has been introduced several times,4" and has been support-
ed by the American Bar Association but opposed by the Executive Branch.'
Those who have sought elimination of the nexus requirement have pointed out
that no comparable requirement exists in foreign statutes.47 As with the
debate over the territorial scope of the tort exception, this domestic debate
would have to be resolved before the United States could settle on a negotiating
position for a convention.
indemnification contract under a liability or casualty insurance policy which covers the claim which
resulted in the judgment; or the judgment confirms an arbitral award and attachment would be
consistent with the arbitral agreement.
Property in the United States owned by agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state which are
involved in a commercial activity is more easily attached. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b).
39. Id. at § 1610(a)(2)
40. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'g 575 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) and 567 F. Supp 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
41. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
42. Letelier, 748 F.2d 790.
43. Id. at 793-95; see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 623-33 (1983) (holding that although instrumentalities established as separate juridical entities
should normally be treated as such, equitable considerations dictated that the separate form be
disregarded where Cuban government was the real beneficiary of the Cuban bank's operations). In
addition, the court in Letelier held that plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the airline was a joint
tortfeasor with the government. Letelier, 748 F.2d at 797.
44. The Letelier court acknowledged that under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs were entitled to
collect from the Chilean government but were unable to do so. "[U]nder the circumstances at issue in
this case Congress did in fact create a right without a remedy." Id. at 798.
45. See, e.g., S. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
46. See Arbitral Awards: Hearing on H.R. 3106, 3137, H.R. 4342, and H.R. 4592 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, 77 (1986) (testimony and statement of Elizabeth G. Verville, Acting Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State); Mark B. Feldman, Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
The ABA Position, 20 INT'L LAW. 1289, 1290-91 (1986).
47. Feldman, supra note 47, at 1300-02.
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B. Procedural Aspects of the FSIA
One important achievement of the FSIA was the elaboration of procedures
for initiating suit against a foreign government other than the then-prevailing
method of attachment of the foreign state's property. Unfortunately, these
service of process provisions have proven extremely confusing, to the disservice
of both private plaintiffs and foreign defendants. The statute8 defines
methods for serving foreign states, on the one hand, and agencies and
instrumentalities on the other hand. For both sets of defendants, the statute
defines a hierarchy. For service on foreign states, for example, the two
preferred methods of service are service by special arrangement and service
pursuant to a convention-that is, the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters.49 If
neither preferred method is available, the plaintiff may ask the clerk of the
court to serve the defendant foreign ministry by registered mail.5" If that fails,
the plaintiff may transmit the papers to the State Department for service
through diplomatic channels.51
These service provisions are bewildering to both plaintiffs and foreign states.
Moreover, some foreign states object in particular to service of process by mail
as an infringement on sovereignty.52 These provisions surely can be clarified
and streamlined. It is worth considering, for example, whether the FSIA should
retain service by mail on foreign ministries, a provision that provokes foreign
governments but does little to improve the situation of plaintiffs.
These shortcomings in the substantive and procedural provisions of the FSIA
raise the question of whether it would be preferable to change the status quo
by amending the FSIA or through negotiation of a convention. Three areas of
concern should be noted in consideration of the kinds of conventions that might
be negotiated. First, would the negotiated substantive law be in the U.S.
interest? The negotiated outcome, which depends largely on the composition
of participating countries, might compound problems with U.S. law. Second,
even if the United States is ready to modify its own law in a convention, other
states might have less interest in doing so, especially those that are satisfied with
the operation of their existing law. Finally, to assess the merits of a convention
fully, we must go beyond doctrinal concerns to determine the magnitude of
actual problems. For many commercial activities, for example, statutes and
treaties are not the only sources of law. Increasingly, sophisticated parties
address immunity in contracts and other agreements, thereby short-circuiting
potentially contentious litigation. Such provisions may go a long way towards
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988).
49. Opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force Feb.
10, 1969).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3).
51. Id. § 1608(a)(4).
52. See DELLAPENNA supra note 21, at 115-16 (countries objecting to service by mail on sovereignty
grounds include Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and France).
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overcoming inadequacies in the existing commercial activity exception.
Unfortunately, however, cases do continue to arise out of agreements that do
not address immunity.53 Perhaps more important, some cases addressed under
the commercial activity exception do not arise out of agreements or consensual
relationships, but involve commercial torts.5 4 For such cases, as well as for
noncommercial tort cases, the "no immunity" contract clause offers no solution.
III
ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED RESPECTING A CONVENTION
Discussion of a convention must consider both what the convention should
say and what the desired set of parties would be. In considering the prospects
for a convention, two possible models emerge: the International Law
Commission's ("ILC's") draft articles and the proposal for a "procedural
convention" made by Peter Trooboff in his 1986 Hague lectures. 5 Three other
instruments deserve brief mention: the 1991 resolution of the Institute of
International Law,56 the International Law Association's 1982 draft conven-
tion,57 and the Organization of American States's ("OAS's") 1983 draft
convention.58
The articles approved by the Institute of International Law represent a very
interesting attempt by the rapporteur, Professor Ian Brownlie, to recast foreign
state immunity law as a set of competing criteria indicating, on the one hand,
the competence of the forum state and, on the other hand, its incompetence.
The effort unearths some of the doctrinal defects in present law and highlights
the areas of intersection between the law of foreign state immunity and related
doctrines, such as act of state and competence. Regrettably, however, its
greatest strength, that it breaks free of traditional approaches to immunity law,
also undermines its immediate utility as a model for a convention. In 1982, the
International Law Association also contributed to the development of the law
of foreign state immunity, producing a draft convention that undoubtedly
influenced later developments, including the ILC articles. Finally, an expert
53. See, e.g., Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1987); Tifa, Ltd. v.
Republic of Ghana, 692 F. Supp. 393 (D.N.J. 1988); Practical Concepts, Inc. (PCI) v. Republic of Bol.,
613 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C.), recons. denied, 615 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated, 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangl., 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Or. 1983), affd, 736 F.2d 1326
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
54. See, e.g., Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989); In re
Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982), vacated, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 1984), remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co. (Pemex), 767 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
55. Trooboff, supra note 21.
56. Institute of International Law, Resolution on Contemporary Problems Concerning the Immunity
of States Relation to Questions of Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Sept. 2, 1991), in 1991 Y.B. SESSION
OF BASEL (Inst. Int'l L.) 388-401.
57. International Law Association, Draft Convention on State Immunity, Sept. 9, 1982, 22 I.L.M.
287 (1983).
58. Organization of American States, Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity
of States, Jan. 21, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 292 (1983) [hereinafter OAS draft convention].
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group under the auspices of the OAS also prepared a draft convention on
juridical immunities of states. That convention departs from U.S. approaches
in many respects, 59 but stands as a telling reminder of the depth of the chasm
between developed and developing countries with respect to this body of law.
A. Potential Conventions
1. The International Law Commission's Draft Articles. In 1991, the ILC
completed its work on draft articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and their Property and recommended to the General Assembly that it convene
an international conference on the subject.'
The ILC began to consider this topic in 1978 and much of its work was
conducted under the cloud of the absolute immunity versus restrictive immunity
debate. It is, therefore, a victory for the restrictive theory that the draft articles
incorporate most of the exceptions to immunity found in the FSIA and in the
law of other restrictive immunity states. Viewed from the standpoint of the
United States's interests summarized earlier, however, the draft articles fall
short in several important respects. 61
A particularly troubling aspect of the draft articles is the definition of
commercial activity. Under the articles, a court considering whether an activity
is a "commercial transaction" should look
primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should also be
taken into account if, in the practice of the State which is a party to it, that purpose
is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the contract or transac-
tion.62
The commentary explains that this formulation "is designed to provide an
adequate safeguard for developing countries, especially in their endeavours to
promote national economic development., 63 Thus, the commentary continues,
if a defendant state can demonstrate that a contract or transaction has a
"clearly public" purpose supported by "raison d'Etat," such as to relieve famine
or to supply medicine to combat an epidemic, and that its practice is to
"conclude contracts or transactions for such public ends," it is immune.'
59. For example, the OAS draft convention, supra note 58, preserves immunity for noncommercial
torts. Art. 6(e) (limiting tort exception to torts arising from trade or commercial activities). It denies
immunity for "trade or commercial activities" only if they are undertaken in the forum state. Id. art.
5.
60. 1991 ILC Rep., supra note 23, at 10.
61. In some respects, however, the draft articles improve on U.S. law. They contain greater detail
about the distinction between "commercial" and "immune" transactions. 1991 ILC Rep., supra note
23, arts. 2(1)(c), 10 (definition of "commercial transaction"); art. 11 (employment contracts); art. 14
(intellectual property); art. 15 (corporations and like associations). As noted earlier, many would also
welcome the fact that the execution provisions do not require a nexus between the judgment and the
property subject to execution. Id. art. 18 (permitting execution against property that is used or is
intended for use by the foreign state for commercial purposes). Finally, the service provisions do not
include service by mail. Id. art. 20.
62. Id. art. 2(2).
63. Id. at 30 (commentary).
64. Id.
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These examples make clear that the so-called secondary purpose test would
eviscerate the commercial activity exception. As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht noted
over forty years ago, all governmental activities have an ultimate public
purpose. 65 Moreover, a past practice of contracting to meet particular public
ends would seem to weigh against immunity, not in favor of it.'
The ILC's commentary notes that inclusion of the secondary purpose test
was controversial.67 The reasons for this controversy are important to our
consideration of the prospects for a convention, because they illustrate some of
the fundamental differences between developed and developing countries. In
the not-too-distant past, the Soviet and Eastern European proponents of
absolute immunity claimed "sovereignty" as the basis for the immunity, while
the West invoked "fairness to plaintiffs" to justify restrictions on immunity. The
emerging North-South debate also pits the private interests of individuals in
developed countries against more public notions of "sovereignty." Upon closer
scrutiny, however, this public-private distinction collapses. Restrictions on
immunity, especially the commercial activity exception, do protect the interests
of individual plaintiffs. More fundamentally, however, the restrictive theory,
especially the commercial activity exception, is premised on a belief in the
marketplace. Thus, a foreign state that wants to purchase medicine avails itself
of the market when it bargains with vendors for the best terms available. Once
the foreign state has taken advantage of the benefits of the marketplace, the
restrictive theory holds that it should also shoulder the corresponding burdens,
including the risk of litigation in a court that would otherwise have jurisdiction.
A purpose test is at odds with these ideas, because it permits the foreign state
to enter into the marketplace but to avoid its responsibilities if it can point to
a "governmental" purpose for the transaction.
Just as fairness to individual plaintiffs has a public dimension, developing
country efforts to preserve immunity have a private dimension. With or without
a secondary purpose test, the parties to a transaction might include provisions
on dispute settlement in the bargain. For example, they might call for
arbitration and specify what law governs a dispute. If the draft articles simply
provided that all contracts for the sale of goods were "commercial," the parties
would know from the outset that there would be no immunity. However, if the
applicable law instead includes a secondary purpose test, the private party would
need to bargain for an express waiver of immunity or otherwise insulate itself
from the assertion of immunity. For many consensual transactions, then, the
practical effect of a secondary purpose test is to increase developing country
65. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problems of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220, 224 (1950). A purpose test almost always leads to a finding of immunity. Victory Transp.
Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
66. See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 42 (1988)
(stating that use of "commercial" forms and methods indicative of commercial activity).
67. 1991 ILC Rep., supra note 23, at 30 (commentary).
Page 305: Summer 1994]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
bargaining power, much like requirements that potential investors include local
partners. Therefore, it adds to the private party's cost of doing business.
The debate about the residual purpose test, then, is partly about the relative
bargaining powers of developed country enterprises and developing countries.
In attempting to take stock of U.S. interests, this aspect of the debate may
deserve greater prominence than the questions of sovereignty and fairness that
usually occupy the field. It is useful to consider how much bargaining power
shifts as a result of a secondary purpose test and how any potential shift
compares to other potential benefits of a convention on foreign state immunity.
In the above-mentioned case of a developing country's effort to purchase a
drug, for example, the practical effect of the shift might be slight if intellectual
property laws made the vendor the sole source of product. This illustration
suggests the importance of gathering additional data about the nature and the
frequency of the problems encountered by U.S. interests in dealings with foreign
states.
It is more difficult to assess the effects of a residual purpose test on
commercial tort actions in which the parties have notentered into a consensual
transaction. In the Sedco case, for example, an exploratory well being drilled
by Mexico's state-owned oil company, Pemex, in the Gulf of Mexico exploded
and caused substantial damage in the United States.6 The plaintiffs alleged
that the drilling was a commercial activity. Pemex, however, persuaded a
district court that it had undertaken the drilling to ascertain the extent of
Mexico's natural resources, a function that was "uniquely sovereign."'69 This
result has been widely criticized, and the district court retreated from it in a
subsequent holding. An auxiliary purpose test would give Mexico a much larger
opening to show that the activity was "sovereign."
As with consensual transactions, a residual purpose test would shift
immunity law towards foreign governments. Other problems exist with the test.
As framed by the Commission's commentary, it amounts to a "nature" test for
the North and a "purpose" test for the South. By contrast, the status quo is
facially neutral. The FSIA and other developed country statutes do not draw
distinctions among foreign state defendants, although their provisions may in
fact have disparate effects on different groups of countries. Moreover, the bulk
of state practice is reflected in developed country law, bolstering (or perhaps
even bootstrapping) developed country contentions that their domestic law and
practice are consistent with international law.
Apart from the definition of commercial activity, the ILC's commercial
transaction exception differs from the FSIA in another important respect. The
ILC's draft does not prescribe special jurisdictional rules for actions against
foreign states, relying instead on the applicable rules of the forum.7" This
68. In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982), vacated, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 1984),
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co.
(Pemex), 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 566.
70. 1991 ILC Report, supra note 23, at 70 (commentary).
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approach is consistent with that used in foreign statutes, but does not diminish
the importance of examining whether the predictability and international
acceptability of the FSIA would be enhanced by revising the statute's existing
exceptions.
The tort exception of the draft articles would change, or at least clarify, U.S.
law in several respects. First, the ILC's exception applies only if the tort
occurred in whole or in part in the forum state. Thus, the exception turns on
the location of the tortious conduct and not the damage. Second, the ILC
exception applies only if the "author" of the act or omission is located in the
forum state. The Commission included this second condition to exclude
transfrontier torts such as "export of explosives ... or dangerous substances."71
Thus framed, the tort exception would not be available to plaintiffs in
"transnational public law litigation" seeking to redress wrongs suffered outside
the United States. Moreover, the required physical presence of an "author" is
unclear. If an official of the foreign state is present in the forum state, is the
author "present?" If Pemex did business in the United States, was the author
in the United States in the Sedco case?
The procedural provisions of the ILC draft articles are thin gruel72 and are
discussed in connection with the proposal for a procedural convention.
2. A Procedural Convention on Actions Against Foreign States. In 1986,
Peter Trooboff outlined a proposal for a convention on the procedural aspects
of foreign state immunity and suggested this as an appropriate project for the
Hague Conference.73 Though Peter undoubtedly will want to make his own
comments about this proposal, review of some of the highlights is appropriate.
A procedural convention might include provisions on:
(a) Service of process. Practice as to service on foreign states is
not uniform, and the United States's resort to methods other
than diplomatic channels has often led to disputes.74 This is
a fruitful area for work. Greater consistency and clarity would
serve the interests of private parties, the interests of the United
States as a defendant, and the interest in avoiding foreign
policy problems with angry foreign states.
(b) Forms. Mr. Trooboff has suggested that suits against foreign
states might proceed more smoothly if there were common
forms for such matters as notifying the foreign state that suit
has been brought, notifying a court that the foreign state claims
immunity, or notifying the foreign state of prospective or actual
default judgment.75 A form that is designed to enable a
71. Id. at 104 (commentary).
72. Id. art. 20 (service of process); art. 21 (default judgement); art. 22 ("privileges and immunities"
during court proceedings).
73. Trooboff, supra note 21.
74. See infra discussion at notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
75. Trooboff, supra note 21.
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foreign state to claim immunity without retaining local counsel
is likely to be of particular interest to foreign states with
experience as defendants under the FSIA. In some cases, the
information contained on a well-designed form might clarify a
case to such a point that a court is willing to dismiss it without
requiring a formal motion to dismiss. Such a procedure might
go some distance toward addressing the objection of foreign
states that they are required to retain local counsel even to
defend against cases that should clearly be dismissed on
immunity grounds.
(c) Model waiver clauses. Uniform language for waiver of
immunity might decrease costly litigation about whether parties
intended to waive immunity.
(d) Filing of foreign state "certificates." Mr. Trooboff suggests
several possible uses of foreign state certificates, including a
certificate that it owns or possesses certain property, a designa-
tion of agents for service of process, or registration of general-
ized waivers of immunity. Anticipating the question, "why
would such a waiver interest a foreign state?," Mr. Trooboff
explains that state-traders might gain a competitive advantage
(or, at least, might lose a competitive disadvantage) if their
potential interlocutors knew in advance of a transaction that
they would not claim immunity.
Many of Mr. Trooboff's suggestions focus on issues that have been sources
of friction under the FSIA. It is difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate the
basis for a foreign state's indignant reaction to a lawsuit in a U.S. court. It may
believe that states are absolutely immune. It may believe that the Executive
Branch, not the courts, should resolve the matter. The case may touch political
sensitivities. The foreign state may object that the case has an insufficient
connection to the United States. It may resent the high cost of retaining U.S.
counsel, which is almost always essential, even if the foreign state has a well-
founded belief that it is immune. It may fear a large judgment by a U.S. court.
A procedural convention would do much to allay these concerns. In particular,
agreed mechanisms for service of process might reduce the number of cases in
which foreign states simply refuse to proceed in accordance with the FSIA,
giving rise to default judgments, or requiring close involvement by the Executive
Branch.76
A procedural convention will only be successful if it attracts broad
adherence. It is therefore promising that many of Mr. Trooboff's proposals can
be structured not as zero-sum games that serve one set of interests while hurting
another but rather as "win-win" proposals that address aspects of foreign state
76. Foreign state concerns about the operation of the FSIA are summarized by a Mexican foreign
ministry attorney in Miguel Angel Gonzalez Felix, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Fair Play
for Foreign States and the Need for Some Procedural Improvements, 8 HOus. J. INT'L L. 1 (1985).
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immunity law that have caused problems for both foreign state defendants and
for private interests. In this connection, some of the procedural provisions of
the ILC draft articles deserve further thought. For example, the ILC's default
judgment provision permits the foreign state to move to set aside a default
judgment within four months of entry of the judgment.77 The ILC draft also
prohibits the imposition of fines or penalties on the foreign state and provides
that the state cannot be required to post bonds or other security during
litigation.78 Some may believe that such provisions are unduly solicitous of
foreign states. They are illustrative, however, of the kinds of proposals that are
likely to emerge in negotiation of a procedural convention.
B. Parties to a Convention
The successes of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Immunity79 and
Consular Immunity' suggest the benefits of universally agreed-upon rules of
foreign state immunity. I am not sanguine, however, about the prospects for
such a universally acceptable convention in the foreseeable future. As suggested
earlier, the former East-West debate about immunity is steadily being replaced
by a North-South debate. The ILC's report and the Sixth Committee debates
may only have scratched the surface of what could be a highly polarized and
unproductive global discussion of immunity.
What about smaller groupings of countries? Initially, it might seem that
there is an inverse relationship between the need for a convention and the
prospects of agreeing on one. For example, there is a need to bring U.S. law
and Latin American law closer together, but it seems unlikely, based on the ILC
and OAS drafts, that these two groups would find much common ground. On
the other hand, precisely because there is so much commonality between U.S.
approaches to foreign state immunity and the approaches of the Western
European countries, there is a good prospect of agreeing on a convention and
a correspondingly low need for such an agreement. With a third group of
countries, however, this inverse relationship does not hold true. The formerly
communist countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union may see
a convention on foreign state immunity as an opportunity to westernize their
law and to abandon an artifact of the centrally planned economy. Western
interests may also perceive a concomitant need for such a convention. In the
short term, internationally agreed-upon immunity rules may be valuable to U.S.
private parties interested in doing business with those states. Looking further
ahead, a convention involving those states might help to strengthen their
commitment to the restrictive immunity camp. At this point in history, we
know that many of these governments are looking west for their legal and
economic models. Over time, however, we may find that some or all of them
77. 1991 ILC Report, supra note 23, art. 21(3).
78. Id. art. 22.
79. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
80. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
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will increasingly see their economic and political fates tied up with developing
countries and not with the industrialized countries. A complete appraisal of the
merits of an agreement involving these so-called "economies in transition"
depends on a better understanding of trends in the law and practice of these
countries and the frequency with which U.S. and other western individuals and




The collapse of the Soviet Union and the movement of the former republics
and the former Eastern European satellites towards market economies suggests
an opportunity to move beyond the unproductive debate over absolute versus
restrictive immunity. This article suggests, however, that the disagreements
between industrialized countries and developing countries would be no less
contentious than the former East-West polemics. Accordingly, U.S. interests are
unlikely to be advanced by negotiation of a global convention based on the
ILC's draft articles. A convention that involves a smaller group of countries
including the former communist countries, however, might achieve some
important objectives and might fit within the mandate of the UN Economic
Commission for Europe or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. Moreover, a global procedural convention on actions against foreign
states would be a worthwhile project and one that would be particularly
appropriate for the Hague Conference.
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